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Introduction
Firms can either retain and reinvest free cash flow (FCF) or distribute it to its shareholders via dividends or share repurchases. The payout policy may have an effect on stock prices. A broad literature has already analyzed price effects within signaling models. Those models predict mainly announcement effects. However, price pressure effects of payouts in an inefficient stock market have been widely ignored. Moreover, price effects have mostly been studied separately for the various payout policies available to a firm. A profound comparison of price effects of various payout policies in inefficient markets is still lacking.
We show that paying out free cash flow to the firm's shareholders, either as dividend or via repurchasing shares, has in general a positive price impact and increases shareholders' wealth, if the market is inefficient due to the existence of so called non-smart Investors and limited arbitrage. Therefore, our paper adds to the literature on the impact of payout policies in two important ways. Firstly, it predicts that, if stock markets are inefficient, positive price effects show up at the payment date. Secondly, payout policies differ with respect to the magnitude of the price effects they cause: Shareholders gain more from share repurchases instead of dividends as long as capital gains are not heavily discriminated by taxation compared to dividends.
Our theoretical approach strongly contrasts the signaling-type approaches of payout policies based on Information asymmetries, which predict a price effect at the announcement date, while in our model abnormal retums are observable at the payment date. These signaling theories can be categorized in two broad groups.
The first group analyzes only Single payout policies. Well known are e.g. the papers of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) considering dividends, while e.g. McNally (1999) and Oded (2005) consider open market share repurchases. The second group compares price effects of various payout policies. Ofer and Thakor (1987) show the announcement effect of a repurchase to be stronger, on average, than the announcement effect of a dividend. The model by Brennan and Thakor (1990) predicts dividends for small payouts, open market repurchases for intermediate and tender offers for large distributions. Under the 1 assumption of asymmetric Information between shareholders and better informed management and adverse selection costs of share repurchases, the model by Lucas and McDonald (1998) predicts that small payouts are made through dividends and large payouts through dividends with a repurchase component.
Also in contrast to our model is the work of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) , who expand the well known work of Miller and Modigliani (1961) . DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) argue in the setting of frictionless markets that the irrelevance theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961) is only a product of the implicit assumption ruling out the retention of free cash flow. If retention is allowed and the NPV of investment policy is fixed, a firm can reduce its value by paying out less than the füll present value of free cash flow. Therefore payout policy matters and investment policy is not the sole determinant of the firms' value in frictionless markets. This reasoning presupposes that retained free cash flow may be invested in zero NPV projects, but not distributed in the future.
Closest to our theoretical approach is the work by Isagawa (2002) . He shows that for open market repurchases not only informational effects in the announcement date may have an impact on the share price. Given that the market reaction on the announcement is incomplete the payout also has also an impact on the share price at the time of the actual repurchase.
Similar to Isagawa (2002) and in contrast to the previous mentioned asymmetric information theories, we build a model based on market inefficiency resulting from the existence of non-smart Investors and (not explicitly modeled) limits of arbitrage. Limits of arbitrage may result from on the lack of perfect Substitutes (see Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) ) or the risk aversion of potential arbitrageurs (see Vishny (1997) and De Long et al. (1990) ). This results in a downward sloping demand for stock 1 and therefore share prices may deviate from their fundamental value. 2 1 Whether the dem and for st ock actu ally sl opes downw ard, is a long-debated issu e in Finance. Scholes (1972) identifies the price impact of la rge block trades and fi nds some evidence for the price pressure hyp othesis which is strong ly relate d to the dow nward slopi ng dem and curve . Shleifer (1986) also finds broad evidence for a downward sloping demand.
In our model non-smart Investors buy stock they consider attractive without fiilly rationally maximizing their wealth subject to the share price and expectations of future values. Due to the existence of non-smart investors and the resulting inefficiency, a share repurchase leads to a price increase 3 and an increase in shareholders' wealth. The same is true for distribution of free cash flow as a dividend. The price per share, adjusted for the dividend, increases and shareholders' wealth also increases, as long as the tax on dividends is not too high. The dividend payment results in a price pressure for the same reasons as the repurchase: the non-smart Investment relative to the firm's fundamental value increases if the firm pays out cash. We furthermore show that the price pressure resulting frorn paying a dividend can be enhanced if the firm offers a dividend reinvestment plan (DRIP). 4
The general predictions of our model are in line with already documented empirical evidence. Davidson et al. (1996) Blouin and Cloyd (2005) find evidence of price pressure when a DRIP is offered by closed end funds.
Furthermore Ogden (1994) reports that the positive price impact of dividends is substantially higher when a DRIP is offered. An empirical study comparing the price pressure effects of alternative modes of distributing free cash flow on prices and shareholder value is -to our knowledge -not yet available.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces a stock market model. In section 2.2 we use this model to determine the share price and shareholders' wealth when the firm retains free cash flow. In section 2.3 we examine the impact on share price and shareholders' wealth when the firm uses the free cash flow for repurchasing its own shares. Section 2.4 provides an analysis of share price and shareholders' wealth when the firm pays a dividend. Section 2.5 expands the former analysis to include a dividend payment in combination with a DRIP.
Section 3 summarizes and compares the results of the various payout policies.
Section 4 offers some concluding remarks and empirical predictions. Let there be two types of Investors in the market. The first type we will call "smart" in the sense that these Investors' demand for shares in t = 0 (rationally) depends on the expected future value, E{Vt) + FCF, and the priceP0 . Thus, the smart Investors' reduced demand function in t = 0 is
This is the demand immediately before distribution of the free cash flow, and if the firm retains the cash, since reinvestment is by assumption in zero NPV projects.
The second type of Investor is called "non-smart". These Investors want to buy shares of the firm because they simply believe in increasing prices. Therefore they are ready to invest a given sum of money, Ä, for any reasonable current price.
This leads to their reduced demand function
The main difference between the smart and non-smart investors is that the total Investment A of the non-smart does not depend on fundamentals, at least not in a sophisticated way. Later on we will also assume that the non-smart investors do not change their demand after the firm distributes cash, i.e., they stay passive.
Let the Investment A of the non-smart investors be "small" in the sense of
The relevance of this assumption will become clear when we consider equilibrium prices. It guarantees reasonable prices.
We omit arbitrageurs as a third type of market participants. It is well known that without limits on arbitrage, share prices would never deviate from their "true value" 5 and hence no price pressure from repurchases or dividends would be observable. We therefore implicitly assume that there are either transaction costs hindering perfect arbitrage, or no close Substitutes 6 of the firm's stock exist.
Furthermore, risk aversion of arbitrageurs hinders perfect arbitrage 7 , leading to market imperfections.
Let the number of outstanding shares be normalized to 1. The total mass of investors shall also be 1, of which the smart investors constitute a portion a and the non-smart the remainder, 1 -a.
5 See Shleifer (2000) .
6 Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) show that the lack of close Substitutes may result in a downward sloping demand curve. 
2.2 Market Equilibrium if the Firm Retains the Free Cash Flow
The scenario where the firm retains and reinvests the free cash flow will be used as a reference throughout the analysis to determine the price and wealth effects that will obtain if the firm distributes the free cash flow to its shareholders.
Given the number of shares normalized to 1, the Investors' demand from (1) and (2), and the relative importance of smart Investors, measured by a, market
Clearing requires
so that the market Clearing price is
This is the equilibrium price immediately before any distribution of free cash flow, and it is unchanged in case of retaining the FCF.
Note that the price in (5) equals the expected future value, including the free cash flow, if all investors are smart, i.e. a = 1. For a < 1 the current share price is smaller than E(V|) + FCF, given the assumption in (3):
So, by assumption, for a < 1 the price is less than the expected value E(V^ + FCF . Only if all Investors were smart, a = 1, the share price would equal the sum of expected value and free cash flow, which we may interpret as the firm's fundamental value. If not all investors are smart, i.e. a< 1, the firm is undervalued, given assumption (3).
We introduced this assumption since, for a price exceeding expected value E(V^ + FCF, the smart investors' expected return would be negative. That would make a positive demand from smart investors unreasonable. Therefore assumption (3) ensures that smart investors always remain in the market. 8
The reason for the undervaluation in our model is that there are not enough smart investors to drive the price up to the fundamental value. In a more elaborate model this could be explained with the risk premium in share price demanded by smart investors, which depends on the degree of risk sharing and hence the number of (smart) investors. 9
Given the price property in (6) we furthermore find that this price P0 from (5) is positively related to the parameter a. We may therefore consider a as a measure of undervaluation resulting from the existence of non-smart investors, or simply of market inefficiency.
As we will see in the next section the inefficiency and undervaluation of the firm's stock is affected when the free cash flow is distributed via a open market repurchase. Our reasoning is in line with the fact, that undervaluation seems to be the main motive for repurchasing share in the real world. 10 2.3 Share Repurchases
Demand and Supply
We now consider the equilibrium share price and the firm's market value after distributing the free cash flow in t = 0 via a repurchase of shares on the open market. To payout the free cash flow, the firm has to buy back shares in a quantity of 8 A m ore general approach would be to assume smart investors with heterogeneous expectations so that, as they drop out of the market one b y one, the price rises above the individual expectation of future value.
9 See Wilson (1968) .
10 Empirical evidence for undervaluation as a motive for share repurchases is given in B aker et al. (1981) ; Baker et al. (2003) and Brav et al. (2005) .
with P^R as the equilibrium price when the firm is in the market to repurchase own shares.
As a result of this repurchase the (smart and non-smart) investors face a reduced supply of shares, which is
The smart investors' demand no longer depends on the free cash flow. In result of the payout it is:
For the non-smart investors we assume that they stay passive if the firm pays out free cash flow. That is, they do not seil or buy shares, so that the number of shares held by non-smart investors after repurchase, q" R , is the same as before:
This assumed passiv:ty may be seen as a further indication of non-smartness. But it may also be rational if the "non-smart" investors are very optimistic about future share price but have only a limited budget of A to invest.
Market Equilibrium with Repurchase
Given the shareholders' demand from (10) and (11) (with (2)), and the reduced supply of shares from (9), market Clearing requires
8 so that the market Clearing price immediately after the repurchase is
Again, the assumption given in (3) implies that this price does not exceed the expected value £(F|):
The firm's stock is therefore still undervalued.
The firms' market value after the share repurchase, MV^R, is the price P" R times the reduced number of shares: This condition holds as long as some of the investors are non-smart.
In our model the positive price impact of repurchasing shares at market value does not result from signaling or any other factor based on informational asymmetries.
It is the price pressure due to the fact that the Investment of the non-smart, A, is increased, relative to the firm's fundamental value, by the distribution of the free 9 cash flow. Therefore, the effect of the share repurchase on the share price depends on the degree of market inefficiency (1 -a Repurchasing shares to payout free cash flow leads to decreasing demand from smart investors: Referring to (1), (10), (5), and (13) we find qs > q" R is of course obvious from the fact that non-smart investors, by assumption, do not change their holdings, and the number of outstanding shares decreases when the firm buys back, so that the equilibrium demand of the smart investors must fall.
But the price per share increases (see (16)) so that the smart investors realize a capital gain of (qs -q** R )(P^R -P0) on the shares sold. We assume that this (additional) capital gain is taxed at a tax rate of r CG > 0 .
The smart Investors' wealth in case of repurchase is therefore the sum of the value of shares held in stock subsequent to the repurchase, and revenues realized by selling shares, net of capital gains taxes.
Formally:
11 This result is st rongly supported by th e empirical findings of Haggard and P ereira (2005) , who report that the price pressure effect is negatively related to institutional ownership, which can be interpreted in our model as the market share of smart investors. The reason for the increase in the smart investors' wealth is of course the increase in the share price (see (16)). This leads to a higher value of the retained shares and a gain from selling some shares, which is positive even after tax. Thus, the smart investors defmitely gain from repurchasing shares even though the firm could invest in zero NPV projects.
The Non-Smart Investors' Wealth
The non-smart Investors' wealth in case of retention of free cash flow is just the value of their stock (21) Repurchasing shares to payout free cash flow does not -by assumption -change the non-smart Investors' holdings. Since the repurchase leads to an increase in share price, the non-smart Investors' wealth obviously increases, too. Their wealth after the repurchase is pexR C=(l-e)9.T"=0-aM-^- 
Demand and Supply
We have seen that repurchasing shares may result in an increase of the share price (price pressure), and thus benefits investors. Next, we consider whether dividends, as a more traditional mode of paying out cash flow, result in a similar advantage for shareholders. First, this will be done under the assumption that non-smart investors are passive in the same respect as in our analysis of repurchases: they simply do not readjust their holdings. In Section 2.5, we will consider the participation of non-smart investors in a DRIP.
If non-smart investors do not readjust their holdings of shares when a dividend is paid, their holding is given by the demand, which has already been determined in (2):
^0
The smart investors' demand after paying out the free cash flow through a dividend instead depends on the expected future value and the price per share:
with P^D for the price per share ex dividend.
Since paying out dividends does not reduce the number of shares, the supply stays constant, i.e., it is 1 as in the case ofretaining the free cash flow.
Market Equilibrium with Dividend
Paying out a dividend does not alter the number of shares. Hence, the market Clearing condition is *0 *0
Solving for the share price P^D gives:
a(E(Vx) + FC F) 0 C7fi\ aE(Vi)[a(E{Vx) + F CF) + (\-ct)A\ a(E{Vi) + F CF) '
This price obviously falls short of the price cum dividend P0 (see (5)) for any FCF > 0. But the difference between the share prices is less than the amount of free cash flow, i.e. the dividend discount is less than the dividend for all a < 1: 13
From (6) we have learned that condition (27) will hold as long as a < 1 is guaranteed. Therefore, given the existence of non-smart investors, the adjusted share price is increased by paying a dividend. The reason is the same as for the increase after repurchase: the non-smart Investment increases relative to the firm's fundamental value after the dividend payment.
Comparing the adjusted price after paying a dividend, P^D + FCF, with the price after repurchasing shares, P" R from (13), shows that a repurchase results in a higher price pressure: 
-R (E(Ft) + FC F) ° 0 (E(V,) + FC F)'
13 A disc ount less th an the d ividend pe r share could also resu lt from a wealth transfer from debt holders to sha reholders. See e.g. Fre nch et al. (2005) for a simple model of this "bo ndholder expropriation" (Vermaelen (1981) ).
Since in equilibrium no Investor sells shares (and the share price drops) no capital gains tax is due. Instead, shareholders have to pay tax on the dividend at a rate of t Div > 0.
In the case that free cash flow is paid out as a dividend, the smart Investors' wealth will thus be:
the value of shares held in stock subsequent to the dividend payment, plus the after-tax dividend received. By assumption, the non-smart investors do not adjust their holdings of shares, so that their wealth after a dividend payment will be PC* = (1 -e)9" + (1 -r*")FCF]
(E(Vi) + F CF) + (l-cc)A cc (l-a)FCF (1 -a)A > T ctE{Vx) + FCF a(E{Vx) + F CF) + Q-a)A
We therefore find that non-smart investors may or may not gain from the paying out of a dividend relative to retention of free cash flow:
Therefore non-smart investor's wealth increases only if the tax on dividends is sufficiently low. The condition (34), which implies a preference for a dividend payment instead of retaining free cash flow, is the same as for smart investors (see (31)).
Comparing dividends with the repurchase of shares yields clear-cut results. The repurchase always leads to increased wealth for the non-smart investors:
14 For an Imp utation tax system the re mig ht be a preferen ce for divid ends, as iden tified for the United Kingdom by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) . Specifically, they report: "Unlike in the United States, pensi on funds have ha d a clear ta x prefe rence for dividend pa yments, at le ast unt il the U.K. government abolished the Imputation system in July 1997.".
a(E(Vt) + F CF)'
Since the right-hand side in the last line of (35) is negative, this condition holds for all t Dw > 0. One reason for this result is that non-smart investors do not pay taxes in the case of a share repurchase. The other reason is that repurchases result in a higher price pressure (see (28)).
2.5 Dividend with Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP)
Integrating a Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP) into the Model
We have seen that distributing free cash flow as a dividend results in an increase of the adjusted share price and may also result in an increase of shareholders' wealth relative to the retention of free cash flow. But the increase in wealth obtains only if the tax rate on dividends is "low".
Our comparison of the payment of dividends with the repurchase of shares has
shown that the latter is definitely preferable for non-smart investors and probably also for smart investors. Nevertheless, a firm may want to pay dividends for reasons outside the scope of our model. 15 We will therefore consider how the already identified price pressure of dividend payments can be boosted to the benefit of the firm's shareholders. We will show that this can be achieved with a dividend reinvestment plan (DRIP).
A dividend reinvestment plan offers shareholders the opportunity to reinvest net dividends in additional shares of the firm. These shares can be bought on the open market, or they can be newly issued by the firm. We will examine the former case; the latter alternative has been already analyzed for example by Bernheim (1991), Bierman (1997) or Peterson et al. (1987) .
The demand of the smart investors after the paying out of dividends does not depend on the existence of a DRIP. The functional form of their share demand is structurally the same as in (24):
For the non-smart investors we assume instead that they will participate in the DRIP and reinvest their net dividend. They extend their primary holding of qns by the number of shares to be bought with their net dividend. In sum, the demand of the non-smart investors will therefore be
This increase in the non-smart Investors' demand implies that they do not explicitly optimize over their Investments, but simply reinvest their net dividend, perhaps out of convenience. Or they actually anticipate a substantially higher future share price and are budget constrained, so that the dividend augments their total investment budget to be invested rationally in the firm. This liquidity effect of distributed dividends has already been considered by Ogden (1990) , who identifies price pressure caused by dividend reinvestment as one explanation for excess retums in the course of so-called calendar or monthly effects on stock prices.
The assumption that all non-smart investors participate in the DRIP and use all their net dividend to buy additional shares is admittedly extreme. We use this assumption to solve for the upper bound of the price pressure and wealth effects of dividends. The lower bound is what we analyzed in section 2.4 with regard to a dividend payment without DRIP.
Market Equilibrium with DRIP
Since we are considering a DRIP with shares to be bought on the open market, the total number of outstanding shares is not affected. Hence, the market Clearing condition is
Solving for the market Clearing price gives
This price exceeds the ex dividend price from (26), where we considered the case without a DRIP:
Condition (40) holds for all a < 1 and r D,v < 1. The price pressure is thus higher if a DRIP is used, 16 because it results in a higher demand (both relatively and absolutely) from the non-smart investors. Therefore, the undervaluation per share is further diminished.
However, comparing the price from (39) with the share price after a repurchase (see (13)) shows that even the DRIP does not result in a higher share price than the repurchase:
The left-hand side in (41) is never positive, so that this condition holds for all a > 0. Condition (43) is less restrictive than (31) for the wealth increase of smart investors in the case of dividend payment without DRIP. The reason is that with DRIP the price pressure is more intense than without. 17 Therefore the smart Investors' wealth is greater if a DRIP is used than in the case of dividend only: 
This wealth exceeds their wealth in the case of retention of free cash flow under exactly the same condition as for the smart investors (see (43)):
o (1-a) > T .
Concluding Remarks and Empirical Predictions
Traditionally, financial theory attributes the impact of a firm's payout policy on prices and shareholder wealth to informational effects. Repurchase and dividend announcements may convey managements' private Information that will be instantaneously incorporated into share prices and influence shareholders' wealth.
Given that Information is disseminated by announcement, the effective open market share repurchase or dividend payment is of no further impact on share prices (adjusted for dividend) and shareholders' wealth. This is a theoretical view which implicitly assumes efficient markets. But, since there seems to be considerable empirical evidence of market inefficiencies, we believe that informational asymmetries are not the only factor of relevance for a firm's payout policy.
In our model we use a downward sloping demand function and the existence of non-smart investors to generate market inefficiency that leads to an under valuation of a firm's shares. The results show that in general, payout policy may reduce market inefficiency. This is because share repurchases and dividend payments has a positive impact on share prices and shareholders' wealth, even if dividends and capital gains are taxed. In particular, repurchasing shares will always increase smart and non-smart shareholders' wealth, taxation of capital gains notwithstanding. Dividend payments also positively affect the wealth of both shareholder clienteles when dividend taxation is not excessive. In comparison, our model predicts that all shareholders will prefer share repurchases to dividend payments unless there is a heavy tax disadvantage of share repurchases compared to dividend taxation. These implications are in line with the observable trend in payout policy that shows a growing importance of share repurchases compared to dividends (see for example Grullon and Michaely (2002) ).
Furthermore, we integrate a dividend reinvestment plan (DRIP) into the analysis of price pressure from dividend payment. The model predicts that offering a DRIP enhances the positive price and wealth effects for all shareholders compared to dividend payment alone. This finding with regard to share price is consistent with the empirical fmdings of Ogden (1994) and may be one explanation for the 25 t popularity of DRIPs among firms that are listed in the US capital market. In the US, we can observe a great importance of DRIPs, whereas in the European capital market DRIPs are not very populär yet (see footnote 4).
The main empirical predictions of our model can be summarized as follows:
» If a firm pays out free cash flow by repurchasing shares on the open market or via dividends the share price (adjusted for the dividend) rises and shareholders gain.
» As long as capital gains taxation is not too high relatively to dividend taxation shareholders gain more from a share repurchase instead of a dividend.
• In case of paying a dividend the increase in adjusted share price and shareholder wealth will be enhanced when the firm offers a DRIP.
The finding of a benefit from offering a DRIP when paying a dividend may be seen as the most practical implication of our theoretical model.
Firms not yet offering a DRIP should consider the implementation of this Instrument to enhance shareholders' wealth.
